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Between us in the city: materiality, subjectivity and community in the era of 
global urbanization 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the conceptual challenges for subjectivity and 
community in an era of global urbanisation. The urban environment comprises 
a complex assemblage of human and non-human entities. Urban political 
subjectivity is thus constituted by a distinctive relation with materiality. This 
reconceptualisation of the subject comprises a challenge to the classical 
morphology that has underpinned conceptions of citizenship and community. 
This morphology has rested on notions of autonomy that are predicated on a 
separability of the agent from context and community. Global urbanisation 
challenges the traditional conception of the urban subject as an autonomous 
citizen. In contrast to classical political morphologies I contend, via Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s account of the reticulated multiplicity of being singular plural, that 
urban political subjectivity is constituted by an ineluctable exposure to alterity 
that arises through our sharing of that which is ‘between-us’ in the city: the 
material fabric of the urban environment.  
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Stone, glass, concrete & gravel 
All we got to keep us together 
Jamie T, The Man’s Machine, EMI, 2009 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper I explore the manner in which global urbanisation poses 
questions of citizenship and community. In particular, I will examine the 
proposition that global urbanisation recasts the classical figure of the citizen – 
imagined by scholars from fields as diverse as philosophy, sociology, political 
theory and human geography to be an autonomous individual separable from 
his/her context – as an assemblage composed of human and non-human 
materials. This recasting of the citizen raises further questions about the 
community to which the political subject belongs and through which they claim 
their political qualities. This requires examining the bond taken to be the 
constitutive dynamic of such community. Community is classically taken to 
arise out of a bonding of entities which gives rise to something that these 
entities in and of themselves, or even in gathering in the same place, do not 
possess. Community thus refers to the entity or dynamic emerging when 
something is ‘between’ these individuals such that they become a political 
collectivity. This paper asks what is between-us in the contemporary city. 
 
In what follows I explore the possibility that global urbanisation recasts 
political subjectivity in three broad movements. Firstly, I address the question 
of the classical figuring of political subjectivity against which any recasting 
would be understood: namely in terms of citizenship and community. More 
specifically, I outline the way in which the city and citizenship are intertwined 
and examine the similar inextricability of the concepts of citizenship and 
community. I will contend that the problematic of political subjectivity 
expressed in the relation between citizen and community is distinctively urban 
in character. Specifically, citizen and community are one way of figuring to the 
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relation of a subject to the plurality that characterises urban life. Put 
differently, we might say it is one way of figuring a distinctly urban way of 
being-with-others. Being-with-others implies that subjects are not atomised 
individuals but rather always already related to others. Such a relation implies, 
however minimally, a bond: something ‘between us’ such that we are related, 
not atoms. This poses the question of what is between us in the city (and thus 
constitutive of the plurality recognised to be characteristic of urbanity). 
 
In the second part of the paper I turn to the question of what is between us in 
the city by exploring the central dynamics of global urbanisation. At the heart 
of global urbanisation are questions of infrastructure. I explore the role played 
by infrastructure in the constitution and interrelation of the key dynamics of 
contemporary urbanisation: metacities and slums. Contemporary urbanity is 
defined by the manner in which infrastructure is constitutive of distinctive 
forms of life. As the basis for logistics, communications, or mobility 
infrastructure (or lack thereof) produces certain forms of subjectivity. 
Contemporary urban life is thus a complex assemblage of heterogeneous 
parts, human and non-human. I thus outline the assemblage that articulates 
urban fabric and city dwellers into a plurality of subjects in the contemporary 
era of global urbanisation. Since it is infrastructure and the material fabric of 
cities that articulates subjects into relations with one another, we might argue 
that these are what is ‘between us’ in the contemporary city. Urban political 
subjects are thus related through the material fabric of the city that is 
constitutive of their forms of life. Here I am particularly interested in exploring 
the manner in which political subjectivity might be recast as a mutual 
exposure to otherness through a shared relation to urban fabric. 
 
In the final part of the argument I turn to this exposure, or the relation between 
political subjects that is constituted by the material infrastructures of the 
contemporary city. I explore the way in which assemblage recasts the 
classical understanding of the citizen. The notion that urban political 
subjectivity is constituted as an assemblage which puts subjects in relation 
through material infrastructure, recasts the traditional conception of the citizen 
as autonomous and separable from his/her context. Insofar what is between 
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us in the contemporary city is constitutive of distinctive political subjectivities, 
political subjectivity and context are rendered mutually constitutive. Traditional 
conceptions of citizen are thus recast by the assemblage that defines global 
urbanisation. I explore this recasting by suggesting that we might refigure the 
classical conception of political subjectivity as a relation of individuals facing 
one another. Instead of a face to face relation we might understand 
assemblage as a relation of touch: exposure to otherness at a point of contact 
or articulation. Understood in this way, global urbanisation recasts the 
problematics of citizenship and community in the contemporary era. 
 
Cities and citizenship 
 
As Holston and Appadurai note (1996, pages 196-7), the city has become the 
arena in which new claims of citizenship are evolving as transnational flows of 
wealth, bodies, goods and ideas erode and recast the traditional lineaments of 
the national citizen. Holston and Appadurai argue that for much of the modern 
period the citizen has been understood as a political subject shaped by a 
distinctive relation to the nation-state. Citizenship thus understood comprises 
a relation according to which rights and responsibilities are outlined in return 
for recognition by (and usually inclusion in) the nation-state. Such citizenship 
is a relation that establishes the basis for inclusion in the nation-state, as well 
as the various mechanisms by which that nation-state might be called on to 
perform various functions (for example, protection of those not included but 
nonetheless recognised as political subjects).  
 
Globalisation and urbanisation have, however, eroded the inclusive character 
of national citizenship, exposing the way in which it is exclusionary whilst 
simultaneously failing to guarantee citizens’ rights. In the face of transnational 
mobility, for example, national citizenship seems exclusionary, giving rise to 
inequalities between citizens and immigrants. Moreover, in the face of rising 
wealth, the nation fails to protect its most vulnerable citizens, belying the 
inclusive nature of national citizenship. Under these circumstances the city 
has become an arena in which social movements contest the meaning of 
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citizenship, elaborating new ‘redistributive right-claims’ around such issues as 
‘housing [and] property’ (Holston and Appadurai, 1996, page 197).  
 
Holston and Appadurai perhaps exaggerate the resurgence of the city as 
locus of citizenship claims. Indeed, the mutual imbrications of the city and 
citizenship are longstanding. Most obviously, the city and citizenship share a 
complex etymological intertwinement evident in the overlapping meanings 
ascribed to the latin terms urbs and civitas (see Haynes, 2007). Where the 
former captures a sense of aggregation, the latter refers to the political 
subjectivity associated with urban environments. This relation captures the 
tension between the sense of the city as an urban mass and the sense of it as 
a political community. As Europeans increasingly referred to the city in terms 
of civitas rather than urbs, political community rather than aggregation, so the 
city became synonymous with the place and practice of citizenship (see here 
Weber, 1966).  
 
The city thus became co-extensive with practices and problematics of the 
citizen, not least the question of the relation of the individual to a wider 
political plurality, the rights the former might have and the responsibilities 
these rights conferred. These questions of citizenship have shaped the nature 
of the polity thought to inhabit and govern the city’s spaces. As Isin (2002) 
shows, the city is a difference machine in which boundaries including and 
excluding political subjects from recognition as citizens are constantly 
produced and negotiated. The character of the city is constituted through the 
drawing of such boundaries. From the plutocracy of Greek city-states to the 
democratic struggles over representation in modern nation-states, the city has 
been the site in and at which questions of who is recognised as citizen are 
resolved by indicating who is excluded. These struggles are played out in city 
streets in terms of rights, recognition and obligations. 
 
The city and citizenship have, therefore, been mutually intertwined for much of 
European modernity. Holston and Appadurai’s claim reaffirms this relation, 
arguing that the subordination of the city to the nation as a consequence of 
the rise of the nation state is somewhat temporary. The transnational 
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dynamics of globalisation are taken to revivify the city as locus of a new series 
of dynamics that recast or reanimate the problematics of citizenship. As such, 
then, the city is reasserted as the crucible of the practices and problematics 
that are constitutive of the category of political subjectivity referred to as 
citizenship. This, of course, poses the question of what precisely these 
practices and problematics are. 
 
Citizenship and community 
 
At root we might say that the problematics of citizenship revolve around a very 
urban problem: the relation of an individual to a plural alterity.1 That is to say, 
the precise shape of citizenship, the precise contours of the political 
subjectivity it names, emerges from a negotiation of the plurality constitutive of 
the experience of city life. Whether it is the question of the rights of the citizen, 
the jurisdiction of the power guaranteeing these rights, or the obligations of 
the citizen to both the power guaranteeing its rights as well as the others with 
whom it coexists, these are all problematics arising out of the relation between 
individual subjectivity and the plurality associated with the city. Lest we forget, 
throughout attempts to identify the characteristics of the urban, heterogeneity, 
or plurality has been the consistent constitutive characteristic that has defined 
the city (Coward, 2009a, pages 38-39). Cities have been perceived as spaces 
in which difference proliferates and mixes. First as a place of migration, 
receiving multiple mobile subjectivities, then as a polis in which agonistic 
interplay is a constitutive feature, the city is defined by plurality (even if its 
citizens regularly try to disavow it).  
 
This agonistic interplay could be framed as the problematic of ‘being-with-
others’ (Nancy, 1991). For many theorists of citizenship the question of being-
with-others translates into a negotiation of the relation of citizenship and 
community (Walker, 1998). This negotiation entails delineating both the 
collectivity to which the individual belongs – and which is thus the entity that 
confers rights and responsibilities – as well as those individuals taken to be 
                                                 
1
 On the plurality of urban life see Wirth’s classic essay, Urbanism as a way of Life (Wirth, 
2003). 
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excluded from such belonging. Community is thus conceived as an 
agglomeration of substantially identical citizens. It is thus also a demarcation 
of those said not to share the characteristics of citizens, those excluded from 
the rights and protections the latter enjoy.  
 
However, plurality entails more than the relation of citizenship and community 
suggests. That is to say, plurality comprises more than the gathering together 
of identical subjects and the exclusion of their others. Plurality entails a 
coexistence of substantially different subjects. It requires the recognition of 
the mutual imbrications of different political subjects. The classical conception 
of citizen and community fails to recognise such mutual imbrications. Instead 
it regards the citizen as a regulative ideal representing the apex of 
subjectivity. Community thus represents the collective entity which can play 
an enabling role in realising the full range of rights to which the citizen is 
entitled. Those excluded from community are taken for various reasons to be 
unable to accede to this privileged state of political subjectivity. Whether 
backwardly degenerate or stubbornly other, the question is how to incorporate 
this alterity into the community of citizens or ward off its influence and protect 
citizenship rights. The question thus becomes both how can citizens can 
realise their rights and how their others can be incorporated into the schema 
of citizenship.  
 
However, as Isin (2002) notes, the citizen is constituted precisely by those 
subjects excluded from the community of citizenship. As such the citizen and 
its others are mutually imbricated. Recognising this gives rise to another 
sense in which plurality might be understood. Where conceptions of the 
relation between citizenship and community look for the agglomeration of 
identical subjects, we may say that plurality comprises the recognition that we 
are constitutively bound to those that are substantially different. The urban 
community is thus not made up of substantially identical entities, but rather a 
complex pattern of mutual imbrications. Such a conception of plurality raises, 
however, the question of what binds subjects to one another such that they 
are mutually imbricated. Whereas the binding of citizens to one another is a 
matter of their substantial similarity, the question of being-with-others involves 
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the articulation together of substantially different political subjects. The 
question thus arises as to what might be between such subjects such that 
they are articulated or imbricated in the way suggested. If the city is 
characterised by such plurality then the question of political subjectivity under 
conditions of contemporary urbanisation is precisely what lies between 
subjects such that they are articulated or imbricated together in the way I have 
described. 
 
The remainder of this essay will explore the question of what is ‘between us in 
the city’. I will contend that urban modes of existence comprise a plurality 
bound together by a shared relation to an urban fabric. Moreover, I will 
contend that an account of the interplay of materiality and subjectivity in the 
contemporary city will, ultimately, comprise a contestation of the spatial trope 
of separation that has been at the heart of theories of citizenship. Notions of 
sovereign (and thus autonomous) citizen-subjects rest on the idea of spatial 
separation between the constitutive elements of the classical imaginary of 
scholars of politics. The connectivity, relationality and materiality constitutive 
of global urbanisation suggests that between us lies surfaces of contact rather 
than interstitial gaps.  
 
The (infra)structures of global urbanisation 
 
What then are the distinctive patterns of urbanisation – and thus of the urban 
fabric– that are constitutive of what lies between us in contemporary cities? At 
the heart of contemporary trends of urbanisation are the intertwined entities of 
the meta-city and the slum. Both of these entities are defined by a constitutive 
relationship to the infrastructures that have become central to contemporary 
urbanity.2 Cities, predicated on technical infrastructures of transport, 
communication, power generation, supply logistics and waste removal tend 
towards a form of urbanisation referred to by UNHABITAT (2006) as 
‘metropolitanisation’. Metropolitanisation is characterised by peri-urbanisation 
(UNFPA 2007): a dynamic in which urban density falls as infrastructure 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed exploration of the range of infrastructures integral to contemporary urbanity 
see Graham and Marvin (2001)  
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enables greater interconnection across distance. However, instead of the 
growth of suburbs around a city centre (i.e., suburbanisation), this dynamic 
generates a form of urbanisation that fills in the gaps between a number of 
centres. Large multi-centred sprawls thus emerge in which many urban 
centres exist under the rubric of the ‘meta-city’. From the Pearl River Delta to 
the Baltimore-Washington Metropolitan Area, metacities are defining the 
character of urbanisation in the contemporary period. 
 
Metacities are defined by their relation to technical infrastructures that bind 
ever larger, multi-centred urban regions into city-entities. Roads, public 
transport, communications, supply logistics, power generation, waste removal 
are all vital in the constitution of the meta-city from a sprawl of urban centres. 
This technical infrastructure thus brings about not simply the networking 
together of a number of distinct entities (i.e., their interconnection across 
spaces of separation), but rather a blurring of boundaries in which centres are 
articulated (though not sublimated) into a wider urban entity. The metacity is 
not simply a sprawl, but rather the articulation together of a number of urban 
centres to constitute another entity altogether (the metacity is thus not simple 
aggregation, but something more than the sum of its parts). Thus the metacity 
is more than a network, though it is predicated on notions of connectivity and 
mobility.3 
 
Intertwined with the emergence of the metacity, and equally – though 
negatively – associated with the technical infrastructures that define 
metropolitanisation, is the growth of what Mike Davis (2006) has referred to as 
the ‘planet of slums’. Defined by their lack of formal infrastructure and a 
concomitant absence of security, slums represent the informal urbanisation 
that has swelled the populations of metacities and, to an extent, driven peri-
urbanisation. Not simply marginal, the slum has become a form of urban in-fill 
that has expanded to fill the various interstices of the multi-centric metacity.  
 
                                                 
3
 The distinction between articulation and aggregation distinguishes metacity from megacity, 
respectively. 
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Lacking security of tenure, personal integrity, property, and often devoid of 
basic infrastructure, slums are the dark matter of the contemporary urban 
dynamic: central to the articulation of the various centres of the metacity and 
yet devoid of the infrastructure that defines metropolitanisation (Neuwirth, 
2005). It is important, therefore, not to see slums as some sort of anti-urban 
principle. On the contrary, slums are both central to, and defined as deficient 
modes of, metropolitanisation. Indeed, discussions of the problems raised by 
slums revolve around the manner in which infrastructures (and, hence, 
security) can be consolidated in these regions (cf UNHABITAT 2006). The 
slum thus does not oppose the city, but rather is part of the dynamic of 
metropolitan peri-urbanisation, swelling urban populations and provoking the 
further extension of technical infrastructures. 
 
The infrastructural density characteristic of metropolitanisation is constitutive 
of a complex ecology of political subjectivity.4 The metacity dweller is 
articulated into a complex assemblage of technologies that generate a 
distinctive form of subjectivity. This assemblage is a heterogeneous 
combination of human and technological entities and capacities. Several of 
these assemblages are worth mentioning. Firstly, city life is constituted by a 
number of logistical assemblages in which metropolitan life is inseparable 
from the technologies of supply that deliver power, food and goods in 
consumable form and remove the waste such a process generates (this 
assemblage is mutually constituted by another through which consumption is 
shaped by technologies of communication). Nominally the centre of the 
process, the consumer is rendered into a complex set of relationships 
between human and material entities: the shopper is thus part of a wider 
assemblage that includes the trucks/planes that transport goods, the 
electricity station that lights the supermarket, the PC through which 
consumption is shaped (and perhaps performed via online ordering). 
Secondly, metropolitan life consists of a number of distinctive mobilities 
                                                 
4
 On the concept of a ‘complex ecology of political subjectivity’ see Coward (2009a). In 
general this concept is intended to capture the sense that subjectivity is the product of an 
assemblage of entities – human and non-human, material and immaterial – that exist in a 
dynamic state of interplay and reciprocal influence and are thus mutually constitutive of a 
subjectivity that is greater than the simple sum of its parts. As such this ‘complex ecology’ is 
similar to the cyborg outlined by Haraway (1991) or the actant outlined by Latour (1988).  
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including the mass movement of bodies, the swift movement of information 
and the precise dispersal of goods, power and waste. The individual worker, 
then is inseparable (and constituted in and through) a complex assemblage of 
transport, fibre-optics, copper wire and tunnels. Finally, metropolitanisation is 
characterised by a number of ways in which presence can be effected at a 
distance: telephone, video, post. 
 
These various assemblages represent complex ecologies of subjectivity in 
which the subject emerges as a consequence of the distinct articulation of a 
number of heterogeneous elements. The subject cannot be understood in 
terms of the engagement of an autonomous individual with a number of goods 
and services. On the contrary the subject is a distributed phenomenon that 
can only be understood by tracing the complex ecologies that are distinctive 
to metropolitan life.5 
 
Urbanisation and the ontological morphology of assemblage  
 
The emergence of metacities, slums and complex ecologies of subjectivity 
exemplify the distinctive constitutive dynamic of global urbanisation: namely 
the assemblage of heterogeneous entities predicated upon technical 
infrastructures (or lack thereof). The defining characteristics of contemporary 
urbanity are thus assemblage and technical infrastructure. Put differently, the 
subjectivity characteristic of the contemporary city is assembled by and 
through (infra)structure. It is the urban fabric of the contemporary city that 
comprises the conduits through which the mobilities that define contemporary 
subjectivity emerge or the walls in relation to which selves and others are 
articulated. It is thus the fibre optics, the wires, the roads and the walls of the 
city that lie between us: that form the articulatory links both in individual 
instances of subjectivity and in wider relations of such subjects and the plural 
alterity of the city. 
 
Traditionally, the political subject as bearer of rights, entitlements and duties 
(e.g., the citizen), has been understood as an autonomous entity roughly 
                                                 
5
 On ‘distributed agency’ see Bennett (2005, page 541) 
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corresponding with the morphology of the human body. Indeed, the political 
subject has been conceptualised as an agent executing choices made 
through a rational faculty (usually implicitly understood as ‘the brain’ or 
‘mind’). This rational faculty is embodied in a bio-mechanical entity that 
provides ways of communicating with, and manipulating, a world that is 
separate to, but nonetheless the arena of, the individual. This is an entirely 
anthropocentric understanding of the nature of political subjectivity in which 
the individual is construed as an entity combining rational faculty and body 
capable of acting in and on the world (Seckinelgin, 2006; Heidegger, 1993). 
This entity is roughly analogous with the extremities of the body (i.e., the 
skin’s surface).6 On the whole this is a morphology that envisages the human 
body as an autonomous subject active in, and yet fundamentally separable 
from, the world. 
 
Contemporary urban assemblages challenge such a morphology, extending 
the manner in which rationality and embodiment are constituted by virtue of 
the role played by technical infrastructures in the metropolitan subject. 
Technical infrastructures are not simply supplemental tools deployed by 
agents otherwise separable from these entities. Rather technical 
infrastructures are constitutive elements of complex ecologies of subjectivity 
(Bennett, 2005a). The subject, or agency, that emerges in, say the use of 
mobile phones, cannot be rendered into separable parts (other than for 
analytic purposes). Instead it is a constitutive combination of technical and 
human to produce something more than the sum of its parts. The subjectivity 
that emerges does not conform to the traditional model which vests agency in 
a rational faculty that, through electro-chemical signals, causes the body to 
move and thus alters the world (by, for example, using a tool in a particular 
way). Such a model is based on a morphology of centralised and unitary 
agency in which the agent is ultimately isolated from the world and must 
negotiate that isolation in order to have an impact upon their surroundings. 
This morphology is a highly psychologised notion of subjectivity in which the 
subject is a centralised point of decision-making that acts outward into a world 
                                                 
6
 I say ‘roughly’ as more sophisticated theories of subjectivity might note ways in which 
differently enabled bodies include the various prostheses that supplement their capacities. 
Page | 13  
 
that, despite being eternally condemned to appearing in, the agent reads 
themselves as autonomous from. The morphology of metropolitanised 
subjectivity is, in contrast, highly dispersed, material, and worldly. Emerging 
from such an observation is a morphology in which subjectivity takes on the 
appearance of a complex ecology of materials – organic and otherwise. This 
complex ecology is previously what has been referred to elsewhere as ‘cyborg 
subjectivity’: not simply the augmentation of the body, but the redistribution 
(and ultimately transformation) of its capacities (Mitchell, 2003; Gandy, 2005). 
 
Central to the ontological morphology of global urbanisation, therefore, is the 
narrowing of gaps: and in particular the elision of the gap that separates the 
autonomous individual from his/her environment. At the core of global urbanity 
is thus an ontological morphology that radically contests the vision of the 
world on which previous understandings of political subjectivity have been 
based. Rather than objects operating (on each other) in a neutral spatial 
medium, global urbanisation gives rise to an ontology in which the neutral 
medium disappears and, rather than move in space, the entities under 
discussion are constituted as assemblages that are articulated together in 
various relationships. This is not a question of the binding together of 
otherwise autonomous entities, but the constitution of distinctive subjects by 
the emergence of new bodies from the various relations established amongst 
contiguous materials. It is my contention that this transformation of an 
ontological morphology predicated upon spacing and gaps to one constituted 
by assemblage and articulation bears witness to the emergence of the 
‘reticulated multiplicity’ identified in Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘co-existential analytic’ 
(Nancy 2000). 
 
Reconceptualising relationality: not a gap but a shared division 
 
It is my contention, then, that the urbanisation of global politics represents the 
negation of a gap or spacing on which theorists of citizenship have 
traditionally based their ontological schemas. The assemblages of global 
urbanisation thus transform the relationality on which the ontological schemas 
of citizenship are predicated. In order to explore this transformation of 
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relationality, it is worth outlining – albeit briefly – Jean-Luc Nancy’s co-
existential analytic. In both The Inoperative Community and Being Singular 
Plural, Nancy takes co-existence, or being-with, as an ontologically primary 
dynamic (indeed, he describes it as the cornerstone of a first philosophy). 
Relations between self and other are thus central to his work. Indeed, he 
develops Martin Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein, or being-with, in which the 
relation of identity and difference, self and other is unavoidable (cf Heidegger, 
1962). Nancy thus makes relationality an inalienable aspect of being. It is in 
the development of this ontological schema that Nancy outlines a conception 
of relationality in which spacing, or gaps, between related entities are negated 
giving rise to a form of relationality suitable for understanding global urbanity. 
 
For Nancy, the relation of being-with-others is to be conceptualised as a 
dynamic of shared divisions, rather than traversed spaces. In The Inoperative 
Community he notes that relationality is classically understood as a matter of 
individual atoms occurring together in the world (1991, page 4). That is to say, 
being is conceived in terms of an individuality in which relations with others 
are construed as a secondary phenomenon arising out of the contingent 
engagement of the individual with the world. Relationality in such an account 
is conceived as a connection between two spatially proximate individuals. It is 
a bond that operates across a distance (however small) ensuring that self and 
other are empirically interconnected (often in agonistic or conflictual relations) 
and yet ontologically separate.  
 
This schema is strongest in theories of citizenship predicated on notions of 
unitary agency and subjectivity. These ontologies share a common disavowal 
of an ontologically primary relation with alterity and, hence, conceive of 
relations with others as ties that bind an otherwise unencumbered individual. 
Relationality is thus conceived of as the crossing of a gap or space. However, 
even those philosophies that take being-with-others seriously are not immune 
from treating relationality as a form of spacing and, hence, running the risk of 
treating alterity as something that can, since it is supplemental to the self and 
spatially distant (despite geographical proximity) from it, be treated as 
ancillary or contingent. One might say that this treatment of alterity as 
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secondary as a consequence of a conceptualisation of relationality in terms of 
the traversing of a space or gap is the fundamental characteristic of the 
metaphysics of presence. It is precisely through this motif that alterity can be 
treated as something separate to be reduced to the status of the same 
through incorporation. 
 
Nancy (2000, pages 21-26) argues that we should regard relationality as an 
ontologically primary dynamic. Alterity is constitutive of a sense of self and 
vice versa. Conceived in this way, relationality becomes a shared division 
rather than the binding of supposedly separable entities. This shared division 
can be conceived of as the boundary where the precise extent of self and 
other is established, the point where self stops and other begins. It is the 
establishment of this boundary that is the ontologically constitutive moment in 
any form of existence. But this boundary belongs to neither self nor other: it 
belongs to both and is thus shared. And yet it also divides. It is thus an 
inalienable surface of contact at which a relation of division is constituted. It is 
in this sense that Nancy frames a co-existential analytic in terms of a 
‘reticulated multiplicity’ (Nancy, 2000, page 9). Existence comprises a criss-
crossing multitude of shared divisions, or boundaries, that – like the 
reticulations of the scales on snakeskin – constitute a number of singular 
identities that only gain their ontological identity by virtue of these divisions.7  
 
This multiplicity of intertwined singularities (or a being that is ‘singular plural’) 
is, moreover, inoperative. Self is always constituted by a shared surface of 
contact with alterity. Shared divisions thus establish limits to any singular 
instance of being and prevent it from become a self-contained presence. As 
such it is impossible for any singularity to present itself as a self-sufficient 
principle of being. It is impossible, therefore, for any singularity to deny that 
there are others (and thus other ways of being) in the world. As such then, all 
notions of presence, all political regimes and ideas, are constantly being 
unworked by the constitutive inalienability of alterity. No sooner is a political 
                                                 
7
 This sense of criss-crossing is also captured in the concept of ‘the melee’ – also outlined in 
Being Singular Plural and utilised by Closs-Stephens (2010) in her account of urban 
citizenship. 
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ideal given some presence and announced as a self-sufficient principle, than 
its constitutive relation with alterity (usually a form of exclusion and denial) is 
noted.  
 
Reticulated multiplicity: articulated elements and singular assemblages 
 
This inoperative, reticulated multiplicity provides a schema for understanding 
the assemblage in and through infrastructure that characterises global 
urbanisation. It is important to note that assemblages comprise a distinctive 
ontological entity.8 An assemblage is not simply a network in which a series of 
distinct entities are connected to one another. Such a networking together of 
otherwise separable entities does not contest the notion that relationality is a 
dynamic in which autonomous entities connect across some form of spacing. 
Assemblage, I will contend, represents a negation of such spacing insofar as 
it comprises the articulation of a number of elements through shared divisions 
into a singular phenomenon.  
 
In Nancy’s co-existential analytic, shared divisions are relations without 
spacing. They constitute, therefore, a kind of joint or hinge at which two onta 
(e.g., self and other) are differentiated, joined and related. That is to say the 
boundary at which the extent of self and other is delineated is both the 
differentiation of self from other, the joining of self to other (since the boundary 
is inalienably mutually constitutive) and the relating of self to other (since one 
derives meaning in relation to the other). This triple dynamic is what I will refer 
to as the articulation of elements. It is important to note that the articulation of 
elements is historically contingent. At any one time the shared division 
establishes where one elements in an articulation ends and where the other 
                                                 
8
 Cf. Bennett: ‘An assemblage is, first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins are 
historical and circumstantial, though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, 
which can be quite strong. An assemblage is, second, a living, throbbing grouping whose 
coherence coexists with energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it. An 
assemblage is, third, a web with an uneven topography: some of the points at which the 
trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily trafficked than others, and thus 
power is not equally distributed across the assemblage. An assemblage is, fourth, not 
governed by a central power: no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine 
the consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An assemblage, finally, is made up of 
many types of actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, vegetables, and minerals; nature, 
culture, and technology.’ (Bennett, 2005aa, page 445) 
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begins. Over time, such divisions may shift changing the nature of the 
elements that are articulated together. It is precisely this articulation of 
elements that gives rise to Nancy’s deployment of the metaphor of the 
reticulated multiplicity: a plurality marked by multiple criss-crossing 
boundaries each mutually constitutive of the elements that they differentiate.  
 
Assemblages are thus a set of articulated elements that have a distinctive 
capacity, capability or agency. As singularities, assemblages are indivisible: 
attempting to remove an element would alter the gathering on which the 
assemblage is based. Moreover, since an assemblage is composed of 
articulated elements, over time as these articulations change so will the 
nature – or even existence – of the assemblage. Within the assemblage, 
relationality is a matter of differentiation at shared boundaries and thus is 
without spacing. Assemblages are not, however, separate entities in their own 
right. That is, the assemblage is not a way of reintroducing the spaced 
relationality of the metaphysics of presence through the back door. As 
(co)existence is a reticulated multiplicity, the assemblage is not lifted out of 
this ontological schema. If anything the assemblage is identified by a slightly 
heavier trace around its borders that distinguish its internal elements from 
those that it shares divisions with. Assemblages are thus consistencies within 
a greater co-existential framework in which separable entities are simply 
fictional.  
 
The assemblage thus represents an ontological schema in which relation is 
understood as a division at a shared surface of contact (or an articulation). As 
such it is a negation of the spaced understanding of relation that has been 
traditionally deployed in understandings of citizenship. This schema of 
articulated elements and singular assemblages is a powerful resource for 
understanding global urbanisation. In peri-urbanisation, for example, the 
sprawl of urban development transforms that sense of the urban environment 
as composed of separable entities into a sense in which a set of elements are 
articulated at shared boundaries. Metacities represent the gathering together 
of a set of urban centres in a way that distinguishes them as an area of 
consistency in a wider urban constellation. As such the metacity is a heavy 
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line traced around singular area of reticulation. Within the metacity the various 
centres are not separable entities, but rather are constituted at their shared 
boundaries. Any change in this articulation would change the singular 
gathering – or assemblage – that the metacity comprises. Finally, the complex 
ecology of metropolitan subjectivity represents the articulation of 
heterogeneous elements to provide singular capabilities and/or agency. The 
metropolitan subject is a reticulated multiplicity in which human and material 
elements are constituted as such by their shared divisions and in which the 
articulation of these elements gives rise to distinctive, singular agencies and 
thus assemblages. 
 
Touching not facing: shifting the Levinasian ethical frame 
 
Asserting the primacy and inalienability of the relationality (that is, of exposure 
to alterity) inherent to urban assemblages is also a critical tool in recasting the 
politics of classical accounts of citizenship. It could be argued, however, that 
precisely such a tool is already provided in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. 
Indeed, Levinas (1989) both establishes relationality as an inalienable fact of 
being (indeed the first fact of being) and takes this relation to be one of 
responsibility and thus the basis for a fundamental ethics. Levinas, thus 
provides a very powerful schema for contesting the classical accounts of 
autonomous citizenship and noting a fundamental responsibility for others. 
That said, the Levinasian account rests upon an ontological schema in which 
the self-other relation is a constituted around a gap or spacing. For Levinas 
responsibility for the other is constituted in the face to face encounter between 
self and other. In this moment of the face-to-face a gap between self and 
other can be perceived. Levinas appears to recognise this ontological spacing 
in his description of the ethical demand made by the other as a projectile 
dynamic. Although Levinas (1989, page 83) describes this demand as like a 
‘shot at point blank range’, there is still the sense in which the relation on 
which his schema is based is a matter of travel between two mutually 
constitutive, and yet separate, ontological loci.  
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In Nancy’s terms, however, the fundamental motif for understanding the 
relation of self and other is not the face to face encounter, but the gesture of 
touching.9 In the face to face encounter we have two entities facing one 
another, in the touch we have two identities articulated at a shared division. 
While in the face to face entities are mutually constituted by a reciprocal call 
across an interstitial gap, in the touch entities unfold from a surface itself 
composed of indivisible membranes. Indeed, for the touch to be touch there 
can be no separation. The touch is thus a joint that is both shared and yet 
divides, the constitutive boundary from which plural entities unfold. It is 
important to think of touching in terms that are not merely anthropomorphic. 
While it is tempting to think of the surface at which touching occurs as one of 
skin on skin, touch comprises much more than this. In the assemblages 
characteristic of the contemporary city, touching is a hybrid event in which 
human and non-human join at shared surfaces of contact: where walls tell us 
about the singularity we are when we dwell in a particular house, or wires 
expose us to the plural others whose message are carried along them. 
 
While one cannot rest too much interpretive weight on such a play of motifs, it 
is worth noting that rather than the ethical demand Levinas establishes, an 
urbanised politics might comprise being ‘in parliament with things’ (Bennett, 
2005b). That is to say, it might incorporate Bruno Latour’s insight that the 
agential assemblages that characterise the contemporary era are 
characterised by an articulation, or touching, of humans and things. And as 
such, being human, means being ‘inextricably enmeshed with non-human 
entities and forces’ (Bennett, 2005b, page 137). Or, rather, being a political 
subject in the cities of the contemporary global north means being articulated 
together with vacated, decaying property, or with superfast fibre optics, or with 
water/electricity pipes (or lack thereof). It is thus to the politics of such a 
parliament with things and its consequences for conceptions of community (or 
being-in-common), that I want to turn to by way of conclusion. 
 
                                                 
9
 For an extended meditation on the importance of touch in Nancy’s thought see Derrida 
(2005) 
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Conclusion:  the material politics of citizenship in ‘the time of the city’10 
 
Urban political subjectivity thus comprises an articulated, relational 
assemblage. This assemblage consists of singular subjects comprising hybrid 
articulations of human and non-human material. These singular subjects are 
exposed to each other at the boundaries where they meet – the objects 
around and through which they live their lives. Urbanised political subjectivity 
thus consists less of citizens and their communities than singularities, the 
materialities they incorporate and the others to whom they are exposed. Much 
of this exposure happens precisely at the material surfaces that make up the 
things between-us in the contemporary city. Walls, houses, trains, fibres are 
all things that lie between us, things that might be incorporated into many 
different singular assemblages and thus, as shared entities, the things that 
remind us of the presence of a plural alterity in the city. It is thus the things of 
the city – the stone, glass, concrete, wire - which are ‘between us’ in the 
contemporary city. 
 
This account demonstrates the importance of recognising the materiality that 
lies ‘between us’. Once recognised, citizenship is transformed from a question 
about the negotiation between individuals and communities to questions of 
singularities unfolding around the shared urban fabric that articulates the 
assemblages of contemporary urban political subjectivity. Indeed this 
recognition requires a recasting of the classical conceptions of the citizen as 
autonomous being and of community as either a binding of individuals or a 
sharing of common essence.11 While singularities might be said to be bound 
together by what lies between them, this indebtedness to the materialities of 
urbanity shatters the autonomy of the citizen’s subject. Political subjects are 
entangled in multiple assemblages, hybridised in ways that make it impossible 
to claim autonomy. Moreover, the plurality of the city, the exposure of political 
                                                 
10
 For an extended discussion of ‘the time of the city’ see Shapiro (2010) 
11 Cf Van Den Abeele’s comment that, in the English language, community refers both to “the 
more philologically valid…com + munis (…being bound, obligated or indebted together) and 
the more folk-etymological…com + unus (…what is together as one)” (Van Den Abbeele, 
1991, page xi). 
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subjects to a plural alterity through the things between-us, shatters the notion 
of shared substance. Singularities are irreducibly plural sharing only what 
divides them, only the surfaces that are their constitutive boundaries. And 
hence, the sense of being in common in the city is otherwise than that 
proposed by classical models of citizenship and community.  
 
According materiality its constitutive role in the ontology of urbanised global 
politics has consequences for the classical conception of the relation of 
citizenship to community. Conceived of as a relation of a bond or common 
substance between autonomous individuals, community is seen as a 
collectivity of citizens. Politics is thus resolutely anthropocentric, reduced to 
questions of the way in which such relations can be negotiated. Indeed, 
democracy is primarily figured in terms of the discursive negotiation of 
differences in a shared conversation borne of the association of individuals 
(cf. Bennett, 2005b, page 136). However, the above analysis, should 
demonstrate that between us in the city is neither an empty space nor a 
simply human bond. Rather between us is a surface of contact, a point of 
articulation, at which heterogeneous elements are assembled into complex 
ecologies of subjectivity. Between us is the urban fabric – from houses to 
large technical infrastructures.  
 
The exposure to plural alterity implicit in such political subjectivity entails a 
different sense of community. Rather than a work of collecting and bonding 
bodies, community becomes an inoperative exposure to others. That is to say 
it is a being-in-common with plural others through the things that form the 
shared surfaces that expose us to that alterity. The things are precisely what 
we have in common. And yet this means that we must recognise that our 
being in common consists of a mutual exposure to alterity and thus of the 
unworking of all ideas of separateness, completeness and sovereignty. As 
such, then there is no individual citizen and no completed community. These 
figures are always exposed to other through things and thus always have a 
constitutive boundary at which they are articulated or joined with their others 
in an inalienable fashion that undoes any sense they may have of separation 
or completion. The urban citizen and their community are thus complex 
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assemblages that have the material fabric of the city – and the plural alterity to 
which that fabric exposes them - in common.  
 
Of course, such recognition will not recast the existing politics of urban 
citizenship immediately. However, it may enable us to unlock logics that have 
been stifled by the classical understandings of citizenship. Primary amongst 
that which might be unlocked is an understanding of the inseparability of the 
heterogeneous elements assembled in the contemporary urban environment. 
Thus the trains blown up by bombers in London and Madrid, the decaying, 
vacant or repossessed urban fabric of post-crash cities, and the armour and 
weapons used to ‘police’ the worlds slums, are all important in understanding 
the political subjects that populate the contemporary metropolis. It is these 
things that we have ‘in-common’ and which thus constitute our ‘inoperative 
community’ (Nancy, 1991). Only when we understand that these materialities 
are constitutive of complex ecologies and assemblages will we understand 
that the insecurities that characterise the contemporary period and begin to 
envision pathways to contesting their violent logics.  
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